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Abstract 
The ability to represent mental states (‘Theory of Mind’; ToM) is crucial in understanding 
individual differences in social ability, and social impairments evident in conditions such as 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET) is a 
popular measure of ToM ability, validated in part by the poor performance of those with 
ASD. However, the RMET requires recognition of facial emotion, which is impaired in those 
with alexithymia, which frequently co-occurs with ASD. Thus, it is unclear whether the 
RMET indexes emotion recognition, associated with alexithymia, or ToM, associated with 
ASD. We therefore investigated the independent contributions of ASD and alexithymia to 
performance on the RMET. ASD and alexithymia-matched control participants did not differ 
on RMET performance, whereas ASD participants demonstrated impaired performance on an 
alternative test of ToM, the Movie for Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC). 
Furthermore, alexithymia, but not ASD diagnosis, significantly influenced RMET 
performance, but did not affect MASC performance. These results suggest that the RMET 
measures emotion recognition rather than ToM, and support the “alexithymia hypothesis” of 
emotion-related deficits in ASD. 
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, alexithymia, emotion recognition, social 
cognition, theory of mind 
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General Scientific Summary 
 This study suggests that a highly popular test of the ability to detect what someone 
else is thinking, the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test, is instead a test of the ability to 
recognise another person’s emotional expression. This is important because it suggests that 
patients who perform badly on this test may still be able to understand another person’s 
mental state, and that conversely, patients who perform well on this test may still have 
difficulties in mental state understanding.  
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‘Theory of Mind’ is not Theory of Emotion: A cautionary note on the Reading the Mind in 
the Eyes Test 
Questions concerning the representation of mental states (‘Theory of Mind’ or ToM) 
have occupied cognitive scientists for decades. The study of ToM has been particularly 
important in understanding individual differences in social ability, and the social impairments 
evident in various psychiatric disorders (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Corcoran, 
Mercer, & Frith, 1995). The difficulty associated with designing a test appropriate for 
detecting variance in ToM ability among typical adults prompted the development of the 
“Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001a), which requires participants to match emotion and mental state descriptor 
words to images of the eye region of faces. This test has been cited over 2000 times (Web of 
Science, May 2016) and has been used to demonstrate gender, cultural, genetic, and 
personality trait influences on ToM, and to elucidate its neurobiological mechanisms (Adams 
et al., 2010; Stone, Baron-Cohen, Calder, Keane, & Young, 2003). Its validity is supported by 
the poor performance of individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) on the task 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a), a group who have known ToM impairments (Castelli, Frith, 
Happé, & Frith, 2002). 
The RMET is unusual among ToM tasks in that it includes emotional states and relies 
on the detection of subtle facial cues, features typically used to test emotion recognition. In 
contrast, the majority of ToM tasks require non-emotional mental states to be inferred from 
contextual information or dynamic behavioural cues (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, 
& Plaisted, 1999; Dziobek et al., 2006). The reliance of the RMET on the recognition of 
emotional states from faces calls into question its use as a test of ToM, and means it is 
possible that the RMET may instead assess emotion recognition. Importantly, if the RMET 
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does not index ToM but rather emotion recognition, then our conclusions about the ToM 
abilities of various cultural and psychiatric groups will require substantial revision.  
It is noteworthy, therefore, that recent evidence suggests that apparent emotion 
recognition impairments in ASD are in fact due to alexithymia (a trait characterised by poor 
recognition of one’s own emotions; Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 1976), which frequently 
co-occurs with ASD (the ‘alexithymia hypothesis’ of emotion deficits in ASD; Bird & Cook, 
2013; Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013). Alexithymia has been shown to predict 
performance on other tasks that require participants to match emotion words to faces 
(Grynberg et al., 2012), meaning that increased rates of alexithymia in ASD may explain the 
ASD impairment on the RMET if emotion recognition ability, rather than ToM, drives 
performance. We therefore investigated the independent contributions of ASD and 
alexithymia to RMET performance, compared to another ToM task that does not rely 
exclusively on facial emotion recognition (the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition, 
MASC; Dziobek et al., 2006). If the RMET indexes ToM, then ASD diagnostic status should 
predict both RMET and MASC scores. If the RMET indexes emotion recognition, however, 
then alexithymia, not ASD, should predict RMET performance.  
Method 
Participants 
19 participants (5 female) with a clinical diagnosis of ASD and 24 (11 female) 
without ASD volunteered to take part in the study. 1 ASD participant had a co-morbid 
diagnosis of dyspraxia and 1 had previously been prescribed antipsychotic medication. 
Excluding these two participants did not alter the pattern of significance. Control participants 
had no past or present clinical diagnosis. 1 control participant did not complete the MASC, 
leaving the final sample at 42 participants. Based on the effect size (d = 1.27) between ASD 
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and control participants on the RMET reported in Baron-Cohen et al. (2001a), we determined 
that a sample size of 19 participants per group would provide power of 0.8 to detect group 
differences using an independent t-test and alpha <.05. Additional control participants were 
recruited to ensure groups were matched on demographic variables. 6 ASD and 8 control 
participants met the criterion for severe alexithymia, with a score of 61 or above on the 20-
item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The TAS-20 is a 
self-report scale that includes questions like "I have feelings that I can't quite identify", and "I 
find it hard to describe how I feel about people." Items are rated on a scale from 1 ("does not 
describe me") to 5 ("describes me very well"), with scores ranging between 20 and 100, and 
higher scores indicating more alexithymic traits. The TAS-20 has good internal consistency 
(α=.81) and test-retest reliability (r=.77; Bagby et al., 1994). The high alexithymia cut-off 
score of ≥61 was established as being 1.5 SD from the mean score of community samples 
(Parker, Taylor & Bagby, 2003).  
ASD and control groups were matched according to alexithymia severity (control M = 
52.43, SD = 13.98; ASD M = 57.58, SD = 11.51; t(40) = 1.28, p = .207, d = 0.402, 95% CI 
for d [-3.371, 4.188]), age (control M = 30.13, SD = 12.21; ASD M = 30.89, SD = 11.86; 
t(40) = 0.21, p = .839, d = 0.063, 95% CI for d [-3.455, 3.584]), gender (X2(1) = 2.04, p = 
.153, r = .220), and IQ, measured by the vocabulary and matrix reasoning sub-scales of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999; control M = 108.48, SD 
= 11.68; ASD M = 109.79, SD = 15.71; t(40) = 0.31, p = .758, d = 0.095, 95% CI for d [-
3.870, 4.067]). As shown by the IQ scores, both the ASD and control groups were in the 
average range for intelligence.  
ASD symptom severity for all participants was measured using the Autism Spectrum 
Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001b). The AQ is a 
50-item self-report questionnaire for assessing traits associated with the autism spectrum, 
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with statements like "I notice patterns in things all the time", and "I find it hard to make new 
friends." Statements are rated from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree", with a resulting 
total score of 0-50, and higher scores indicating more autistic traits. The AQ has good 
internal consistency (α=0.82; Austin, 2005) and test-retest reliability (r=0.70; Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001b). AQ scores were significantly higher in the ASD (M = 32.74, SD = 9.33) than 
control (M = 21.91, SD = 11.06) group (t(40) = 3.38, p = .002, d = 1.073 , 95% CI for d [-
1.944, 4.090]). Current functioning in the ASD group was assessed using the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS-G; Lord et al., 2000). Four participants did not 
meet ADOS criteria for ASD, but they received diagnoses from independent clinicians, were 
not outliers on any measure, and their exclusion did not alter the pattern of significance. The 
study was approved by the University of Surrey Research Ethics Committee. 
Procedure 
Order of RMET and MASC administration was counterbalanced across participants. 
The RMET comprised 36 stimuli depicting the eye section of a face. For each stimulus, 
participants were required to select one of four verbal labels, presented underneath the image, 
that best described what the individual was thinking or feeling. Examples include items such 
as "upset", "excited", and "terrified". The stimuli were identical to those used in the revised 
RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a) and were presented in black and white at a standard size. 
19 faces were male and 17 female. A gender identification control task was not used due to 
previous ceiling effects in comparable populations (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a). Each 
stimulus was presented on a computer screen for unlimited time, however participants were 
instructed to respond with their best estimate if they felt unsure of the answer, to prevent 
them spending too long looking at each stimulus. Responses were made via a key press. 
RMET score was calculated as total correct responses (maximum 36). The internal 
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consistency of the RMET is modest, with Cronbach's alpha varying between 0.37-0.61 across 
cultural adaptations (Khorashad et al., 2015; Vellante et al., 2012). 
The MASC involved watching a 15-minute film depicting four individuals 
socialising, interrupted at intervals with a mental state or control question about the section of 
film that had just been played. The 45 mental state questions focused on why characters were 
behaving in a particular way; it should be noted however that 18 of the mental state questions 
on the MASC are relatively more dependent on emotional mental state decoding (e.g. “what 
is Betty feeling?”) whereas the remaining questions measure cognitive ToM (e.g. “what is 
Sandra thinking?”); see Montag et al. (2010). The 21 control questions related to specific 
details given in the film to ensure that participants were paying attention (e.g. “what time are 
they meeting?”). Participants responded to each question by selecting from four possible 
answers and recorded their answers on an answer sheet. MASC score was calculated as total 
correct responses to the mental state questions (maximum 45). The mental state questions on 
the MASC have been shown to have a high internal consistency (α=0.84), high intraclass 
correlation coefficients in the assessment of test-retest reliability (ICC=0.97), and to be 
sensitive to subtle ToM difficulties in participants in adults of normal intelligence (Dziobek 
et al., 2006). Control question score was calculated as total correct responses to the control 
questions (maximum 21; additional control questions were used as per Santiesteban et al., 
2015, to provide more possibility for any between-group variance in control question 
performance to be detected, if present, and were generated as in the original version of the 
task, such that they assessed general comprehension and memory for the material, but not the 
understanding of mental states: control questions are listed in Supplementary Table 1).  
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Results 
One participant in the ASD group was excluded from MASC analyses due to being an 
outlier (> 3 SD from the mean) on this task.  
RMET. The ASD (M = 26.32, SD = 3.77) and alexithymia-matched control (M = 
26.65, SD = 2.99) groups did not differ on RMET score (t(40) = 0.32, p = .749, d = 0.101, 
95% CI for d [-0.892, 1.093]; Figure 1a). A Bayes Factor of 0.317 suggested that the data 
were over 3.15 times as likely under the null hypothesis as under the alternative hypothesis.  
However, when comparing alexithymic and non-alexithymic participants as two 
groups (regardless of ASD), the alexithymic group (M = 24.71, SD = 2.84) exhibited 
significantly worse RMET performance than the non-alexithymic group (M = 27.39, SD = 
3.24; t(40) = 2.63, p = .012, d = 0.881, 95% CI for d [-0.038, 1.801]; Figure 1b). A Bayes 
Factor of 4.287 provided strong support for a group difference. The alexithymic group also 
performed significantly worse than the control participants reported in Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001a) (N = 225, M = 27.02, SD = 3.67; independent-samples t test: t(237) = 2.31, p = .021, 
d = 0.638, 95% CI for d [0.094, 1.180]), illustrating that the alexithymic group was also 
impaired compared to published normative data on control participant RMET performance.   
MASC. In contrast to the findings for the RMET, the control group (M = 35.70, SD = 
3.31) performed significantly better on the MASC than the ASD group (M = 31.22, SD = 
4.60; t(39) = 3.62, p = .001, d = 1.170, 95% CI for d [-0.001, 2.342]), ruling out the 
possibility that the ASD group had intact ToM. This significant group difference was 
supported by a Bayes Factor of 36.40. There was no significant difference in the total number 
of MASC control questions correctly answered between the ASD group and the control group 
(control M = 18.91, SD = 1.68; ASD M = 18.22, SD = 2.39; t(39) = 1.09, p = .284, d = 0.334 , 
95% CI for d [-.241, .940]). 
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No significant difference between alexithymia groups was found for MASC scores 
(alexithymic M = 34.71, SD = 4.27; non-alexithymic M = 33.22, SD = 4.58; t(39) = 1.01, p = 
.318, d = 0.341, 95% CI for d [-1.678, 0.996]). A Bayes Factor of .475 indicated that the data 
were over 2.1 times as likely under the null than alternative hypothesis. 
Hierarchical regression analyses. Hierarchical regression analyses were used to 
compare the independent contribution of alexithymia and ASD symptom severity to RMET 
and MASC performance, respectively. These analyses included the effect of gender in the 
first step as the gender balance of the ASD and Control groups was numerically (although not 
significantly) different, and gender has been associated with both facial emotion recognition 
(Forni-Santos & Osório, 2015) and ToM (e.g. Devine & Hughes, 2013). Accordingly, 
performance on the RMET was analysed using a hierarchical regression in which gender was 
entered in the first step, AQ scores were entered in the second step, and TAS-20 scores in the 
third step. TAS-20 scores remained a significant predictor of RMET performance 
(standardised  = -.410, p = .030, 95% CI for  [-.199, -.011], ΔR2 = 11.5%), even after 
accounting for gender and AQ scores, but AQ scores were not a significant predictor in either 
the second or third steps of the regression (second step:  = -.111, p = .490, 95% CI for  [-
.124, .061], ΔR2 = 1.2%; third step:  = .104, p = .565, 95% CI for  [-.074, .134]). When 
analysing performance on the MASC, gender was entered in the first step, TAS-20 scores in 
the second, and AQ scores in the final step. In this model neither TAS-20 ( = -.161, p = 
.304, 95% CI for  [-.162, .052], ΔR2 = 2.5%) nor AQ scores ( = -.277, p = .125, 95% CI for 
 [-.243, .031], ΔR2 = 5.5%) predicted MASC scores; therefore, a follow-up analysis 
focussed on those MASC items which do not ask about ‘feelings’ and are thus less dependent 
on emotion understanding, constituting a test of cognitive ToM (Montag et al., 2010). The 
same analysis applied to these items revealed that AQ scores were a significant predictor of 
performance ( = -.357, p = .046, 95% CI for  [-.188, -.002], ΔR2 = 9.1%) even after 
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controlling for TAS-20 scores and gender. Full details of the hierarchical regression analyses 
are presented in Supplementary Table 2. 
Discussion 
This study attempted to determine whether the RMET, currently the most popular test 
of ToM in adults, is a valid measure of ToM, or whether performance is in fact determined by 
emotion recognition ability. Deficits in emotion recognition are commonly associated with 
alexithymia, and the ‘alexithymia hypothesis’ of emotion-related impairments in ASD (Bird 
& Cook, 2013) suggests that in individuals with ASD and co-morbid alexithymia, it is 
alexithymia, rather than ASD per se, which impairs emotion recognition performance. We 
therefore investigated whether alexithymia or ASD was the better predictor of RMET 
performance, given the reliance of the RMET on the ability to perceive facial emotion. We 
also measured whether either ASD or alexithymia could predict performance on a validated 
ToM task (the MASC) which relies on emotion recognition to a lesser extent than the RMET. 
Alexithymia, rather than ASD diagnosis, predicted RMET performance, while ASD 
diagnosis and symptom severity, rather than alexithymia, predicted performance on the 
MASC task. These results suggest that the RMET may be better characterised as a test of 
emotion recognition than of mental state understanding. 
Should converging evidence for the reliance of the RMET on emotion recognition 
ability be obtained, substantial revision of conclusions based on over 2000 studies is required. 
Such revision will be urgently needed for studies that have been used to support diagnostic or 
therapeutic approaches with clinical groups (e.g. Anagnostou et al., 2012; Berlim, McGirr, 
Beaulieu, & Turecki, 2011). In addition, the current data may explain inconsistencies in both 
the ToM and emotion recognition literatures regarding the abilities of clinical groups. For 
example, contemporary adaptations of the RMET have failed to show significant differences 
in performance between ASD and neurotypical participants (Back, Ropar & Mitchell, 2007; 
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Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet, & Pichal, 2001), challenging the original RMET findings. The 
current results suggest that such inconsistent findings are likely a product of sampling 
variance with respect to alexithymia in ASD samples; those studies with a greater proportion 
of alexithymic participants in their samples of individuals with ASD would be more likely to 
report ‘ASD-related’ deficits than studies with fewer alexithymic participants within the ASD 
group. Within studies of typical individuals, these results are also likely to explain why poor 
correlations have been reported between the RMET and alternative tests of ToM, such as the 
Strange Stories and Faux Pas tasks (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Spek, Scholte & van Berckelaer-
Onnes, 2010).  
The present data suggest that the RMET measures emotion recognition rather than 
ToM. However, it might be argued that the process of emotion recognition could be defined 
as a form of mental state inference. Under this account, the ability measured by the RMET 
might be most precisely described as ‘emotion recognition’, but the test would still index 
ToM. The link between ToM and emotion recognition is relatively under-investigated: 
emotion recognition is moderately related to ToM tasks in non-clinical and ASD populations 
in some samples (Dyck, Ferguson & Shochet, 2001), but not in others (Bora et al., 2005) and 
may depend on the particular ToM tasks selected. However, clinical dissociations between 
emotion recognition and ToM performance lend additional support to the proposal that 
emotion recognition and mental state inference are discrete cognitive processes. Young adults 
diagnosed with conduct disorder (especially with callous-unemotional traits) display poor 
performance on the RMET and other emotion recognition tasks, when compared to the 
typical population (Fairchild et al., 2009; Sharp, 2008). Despite poor emotion recognition 
performance, the same group tend to perform at average level on alternative ToM tasks and 
have intact mentalising capacity (O'Nions et al., 2014). Conversely, recent research into 
social functioning in dementia has found the reverse: evidence of impaired ToM with 
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simultaneously intact emotion recognition during a video vignette task (Freedman et al., 
2013). These and similar results would argue against the suggestion that emotion recognition 
involves the same cognitive processes as ToM. 
Our data support the majority of the literature in suggesting that alexithymia is not 
strongly associated with ToM performance. Moriguchi and colleagues (2006) reported a 
greater deficit on mentalising measured via an animated shapes task in a non-clinical sample 
of individuals with high alexithymia compared to low alexithymia. However, most research 
contradicts this finding across a number of ToM tasks, including the Strange Stories and false 
belief tasks (Lane et al., 2015; Milosavljevic et al., 2016). A recent paper (Gökçen, 
Frederickson, & Petrides, in press) demonstrated that although higher TAS-20 scores in a 
non-clinical sample were correlated with poorer performance on the MASC, alexithymia did 
not predict ToM performance once autistic traits were controlled for, a finding that is in line 
with our current results. 
One limitation of the current study is that although the control and ASD groups did 
not differ significantly on alexithymia severity, the ASD group still showed higher 
alexithymia scores than the control group, with a moderate effect size. Nonetheless, the fact 
that there was no significant difference in RMET performance between the control and ASD 
groups, despite a higher mean score for alexithymia in the ASD group, suggests that a more 
closely matched sample might show even more similar RMET performance than found in our 
participants. Another limitation that should be considered is the small sample size, 
particularly with regard to the ASD group. Finally, our sample included a relatively low 
proportion of participants who met the criterion for severe alexithymia in both the control 
(33.33%) and ASD (31.58%) groups. Future research could investigate RMET performance 
in matched groups with higher rates of alexithymia, ideally with an equal proportion of 
participants scoring above and below the cut-off of ≥61 in each group.  
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Overall, the present study demonstrates that the RMET indexes emotion recognition, 
rather than ToM ability. It also provides further support for the alexithymia hypothesis of 
emotion-related impairments in ASD (Bird & Cook, 2013), which posits that, where emotion 
recognition deficits are observed in ASD, they are attributable to co-occurring alexithymia, 
rather than to ASD per se. We therefore urge caution when using the RMET to measure 
mental state understanding and encourage researchers to control for alexithymia when using 
tasks with an emotional component to measure social cognition.  
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Figure 1. RMET performance was unaffected by ASD (a), but was negatively impacted by 
alexithymia (b). Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. Asterisk indicates significant 
difference at p < .05. 
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Supplementary Material 
Supplementary Methods 
MASC Control Questions 
The control questions for the MASC were as used in Santiesteban et al. (2015) and are listed 
in Supplementary Table 1. 
Supplementary Table 1 
MASC Control Questions 
Location 
in film 
after ToM 
question 
no. 
Question text Answer text Correct 
A B C D 
3 Who did Betty 
say Sandra 
thought was 
cute? 
Pete Cliff Michael David B 
6 How many 
times has 
Sandra met 
Cliff before 
now? 
Never Once Twice Many 
times 
B 
6 What time are 
they meeting? 
7pm 8pm 9pm 7:30pm B 
8 What did Cliff 
say wasn’t a 
reason for 
coming? 
Drinks The meal To flirt To get the 
money 
back from 
Michael 
C 
9 What did Cliff 
ask for? 
A cola Water Orange 
juice 
Beer A 
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12 How long were 
Cliff and his ex 
together? 
4 years 3 years 2 years 4 months A 
12 What country 
did Sandra’s ex 
go to? 
The 
Netherlands 
Sweden Denmark Germany B 
13 How did Cliff 
likely shave in 
Sweden? 
Outdoors 
with an 
electric 
shaver 
As usual, 
in the 
bathroom 
With a 
razor and 
cold 
water 
In his 
hotel 
room 
C 
14 Who has 
owned pets? 
Michael and 
Betty 
Michael 
and Cliff 
Cliff and 
Sandra 
Betty and 
Cliff 
C 
20 Which 
character 
hasn’t met two 
of the other 
characters 
before this 
point? 
Sandra Betty Cliff Michael B 
26 Who does 
Sandra look at 
during the 
toast? 
Betty Cliff Michael Paulie B 
29 Apart from 
Sandra, who 
else enjoys 
motorcycles? 
Betty Cliff Michael Paulie A 
30 How many 
cups of cream 
go in the 
recipe? 
1 2 3 4 B 
33 What kind of 
pasta sauce are 
the four 
characters 
preparing? 
A sauce 
with 
sardines 
A sauce 
with 
ground 
meat 
A sauce 
with red 
peppers 
A sauce 
with 
salmon 
C 
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37 How many 
characters 
don’t drink 
alcohol? 
2 1 0 3 C 
38 Which chips 
does Betty have 
to play? 
The white 
chips 
She can 
pick any 
color 
The black 
chips 
The same 
chips that 
Cliff 
played 
A 
39 How many 
people is the 
game intended 
for? 
1 3 5 4 or 2 D 
44 Who is likely 
to have drunk 
more alcohol 
by the time 
they go to 
sleep? 
Michael Cliff Sandra Betty D 
45 What are 
Cliff’s 
favourite 
leisure time 
activities? 
Playing 
sports 
Engaging 
in various 
cultural 
activities 
Going to 
parties 
Reading 
books 
B 
45 Which of the 
four characters 
is involved in a 
relationship? 
None of 
them 
Cliff and 
Sandra 
Michael Betty A 
45 What was the 
weather like on 
that evening? 
Cold and 
dry 
Mild and 
overcast 
Rainy Cold and 
snowy 
A 
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Supplementary Results 
Supplementary Table 2 
Hierarchical Regression Analyses  
a  RMET performance 
Step Predictor Β p R2 ΔR2 
1 Gender -.104 .511 1.1% 1.1% 
2 Gender -.094 .556 
2.3% 1.2% 
ASD severity -.111 .490 
3 Gender -.027 .864 
13.8% 11.5% ASD severity .104 .565 
Alexithymia -.410 .030 
b  MASC mental state performance 
Step Predictor Β p R2 ΔR2 
1 Gender .320 .041 10.2% 10.2% 
2 Gender .353 .028 
12.7% 2.5% 
Alexithymia -.161 .304 
3 Gender .346 .029 
18.2% 5.5% Alexithymia -.012 .949 
ASD severity -.277 .125 
c  MASC cognitive ToM performance 
Step Predictor Β p R2 ΔR2 
1 Gender .347 .026 12.0% 12.0% 
2 Gender .363 .025 
12.6% 0.6% 
Alexithymia -.077 .621 
3 Gender .353 .023 
21.7% 9.1% Alexithymia .116 .513 
ASD severity -.357 .046 
 
Note. Regression analyses predicting (a) RMET performance (including gender in the first 
step, ASD symptom severity in the second step, and alexithymia in the third step); (b) 
performance on all mental state MASC questions (including gender in the first step, 
alexithymia in the second step, and ASD symptom severity in the third step); and (c) 
performance on pure cognitive ToM MASC questions (including gender in the first step, 
alexithymia in the second step, and ASD symptom severity in the third step). 
